Moral Cognition, Emotions, and Neuroscience: An Integrative Developmental View

Article type: Review Article

Authors: Smetana, Judith G. | Killen, Melanie

Affiliations: University of Rochester, USA | University of Maryland, USA

Note: [] Address for correspondence: Judith Smetana, Ph.D., Department of Clinical & Social Sciences in Psychology, Meliora Hall, RC 270266, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627. E-mail: smetana@psych.rochester.edu

Abstract: Longstanding debates about whether morality is best defined in terms of emotions or judgments have been recently rekindled. In this essay, we review recent approaches from social psychology and moral neuroscience that have emphasized emotions and intuitions as central to morality. We assert that the results of developmental science research on judgments and reasoning informs these approaches and provides an integrative view, drawing on judgments and emotions to explain the acquisition of morality in ontogenesis. We discuss developmental research that supports a theory of morality in which judgments are central and children use emotions to interpret morally relevant situations. Drawing on extensive empirical findings, we conclude that defining morality as the principled treatment of others based on fairness, justice, and others' welfare remains the fundamental basis of morality in humans.

Keywords: Moral emotion, moral judgement, moral neuroscience

DOI: 10.3233/DEV-2008-2309

Journal: International Journal of Developmental Science, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 324-339, 2008