StatVerif: Verification of stateful processes

Issue title: Computer Security Foundations

Guest editors: Michael BackesGuest Editor and Steve ZdancewicGuest Editor

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Arapinis, Myrto | Phillips, Joshua^{; *} | Ritter, Eike | Ryan, Mark D.

Affiliations: School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK. E-mails: m.d.arapinis@cs.bham.ac.uk, j.phillips@cs.bham.ac.uk, e.ritter@cs.bham.ac.uk, m.d.ryan@cs.bham.ac.uk

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author. E-mail: j.phillips@cs.bham.ac.uk.

Abstract: We present StatVerif, which is an extension of the ProVerif process calculus with constructs for explicit state, in order to be able to reason about protocols that manipulate global state. Global state is required by protocols used in hardware devices (such as smart cards and the trusted platform module), as well as by protocols involving databases that store persistent information. We provide the operational semantics of StatVerif. We extend the ProVerif compiler to a compiler for StatVerif, which takes processes written in the extended process language and produces Horn clauses. Our compilation is carefully engineered to avoid many false attacks. We prove the correctness of the StatVerif compiler. We illustrate our method on two examples: a small hardware security device and a contract signing protocol. We are able to prove their desired properties automatically.

Keywords: Cryptographic protocols, verification, stateful processes, Horn clauses

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-140501

Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 743-821, 2014