Journal of Computer Security - Volume 10, issue 4

Authors: Cuppens, Frédéric

Article Type: Editorial

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2002-10401

Citation: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 299-300, 2002

Authors: Brose, Gerald

Article Type: Research Article

Abstract: Specifying and managing access rights in large distributed systems is a non-trivial task. This paper presents a language-based approach to policy-based management of access rights. We develop an object-oriented access model and a concrete syntax that is designed to allow both flexible and manageable access control policies for CORBA objects. We introduce a typed construct for access rights called view that allows static type checking of specifications and show how a realistic example policy is expressed using this notation.

Keywords: Access control, policy languages, management, CORBA

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2002-10402

Citation: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 301-337, 2002

Authors: Schellhorn, Gerhard | Reif, Wolfgang | Schairer, Axel | Karger, Paul | Austel, Vernon | Toll, David

Article Type: Research Article

Abstract: We present two generic formal security models for operating systems of multiapplicative smart cards. The models formalize the main security aspects of secrecy, integrity, secure communication between applications and secure downloading of new applications. The first model is as abstract as possible, whereas the second extends the first by adding practically relevant issues such as a structured file system. The models satisfy a common security policy consisting of authentication and intransitive noninterference. The policy extends the classical security policy of Bell/LaPadula and Biba models, but avoids the need for trusted processes that are allowed to circumvent the security policy. Instead …trusted processes are incorporated directly in the model itself and are subject to the security policy. The security policy has been formally proven to be correct for both models. Show more

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2002-10403

Citation: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 339-367, 2002

Authors: Bieber, P. | Cazin, J. | Girard, P. | Lanet, J.-L. | Wiels, V. | Zanon, G.

Article Type: Research Article

Abstract: This paper presents an approach enabling a smart card issuer to verify that a new applet securely interacts with already downloaded applets. A security policy has been defined that associates levels to applet attributes and methods and defines authorized flows between levels. We propose a technique based on model checking to verify that actual information flows between applets are authorized. We illustrate our approach on applets involved in an electronic purse running on Java enabled smart cards.

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2002-10404

Citation: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 369-398, 2002

Authors: Welch, Ian | Stroud, Robert J.

Article Type: Research Article

Abstract: Securing application resources or defining finer-grained access control for system resources using the Java security architecture requires manual changes to source code. This is error-prone and cannot be done if only compiled code is present. We show how behavioural reflection can be used to enforce security policies on compiled code. Other authors have implemented code rewriting toolkits that achieve the same effect but they either require policies to be expressed in terms of low level abstractions or require the use of new high level policy languages. Our approach allows reuseable policies to be implemented as metaobjects in a high level …object oriented language (Java), and then bound to application objects at loadtime. The binding between metaobjects and objects is implemented through bytecode rewriting under the control of a declarative binding specification. We have implemented this approach using Kava which is a portable reflective Java implementation. Kava allows customisation of a rich range of runtime behaviour, and provides a non-bypassable meta level suitable for implementing security enforcement. We discuss how we have used Kava to show how to secure a third-party application, how we prevent Kava being bypassed, and compare its performance with non-reflective security enforcement. Show more

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2002-10405

Citation: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 399-432, 2002

Article Type: Other

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2002-10406

Citation: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 433-434, 2002