Auction mechanisms for preference driven ad exchanges

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Azoulay, Rina^{a; *} | David, Esther^b

Affiliations: [a] Department of Computer Science, | [b] Department of Computer Science,

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author: Rina Azoulay, Department of Computer Science, Jerusalem College of Technology, Jerusalem, Israel. E-mail: rrinaa@gmail.com.

Abstract: In this paper we concentrate on ad exchange mechanisms that take into consideration the publishers’ preferences concerning the attributes of ads published in their ad space, in addition to their desire to earn money from the ads. We suggest allocation (ad placement) and pricing protocols which take into account preferences of both the publishers and the advertisers. The most promising protocol, the Weighted Bipartite Hungarian VCG protocol, collects the preferences of the auction’s participants and uses the Hungarian algorithm to maximize a weighted function of their preferences. Simulations show that this advantageous protocol can maintain a balanced budget over time while preserving most of the desired economic properties (e.g., individual rational, and truth telling), and reaches near optimal solutions.

Keywords: Agent-based marketplaces, auction markets, ad exchanges

DOI: 10.3233/MGS-170268

Journal: Multiagent and Grid Systems, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 203-236, 2017