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Issue title: Special Section: Big data analysis techniques for intelligent systems
Guest editors: Ahmed Farouk and Dou Zhen
Article type: Research Article
Authors: Liu, Kaia; b | Zhou, Hongmina; b; * | Kou, Yuanyuanc | Zhang, Jiabaoa | Zhou, Xujuand | Zhang, Xiantanga; b
Affiliations: [a] Shandong Key Laboratory of Civil Engineering Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China | [b] College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China | [c] College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China | [d] School of Management and Enterprise, University of Southern Queensland, Springfield, Australia
Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author. Hongmin Zhou, Shandong Key Laboratory of Civil Engineering Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China. E-mail: hongminzhou@163.com.
Abstract: The promotion and use of passive building can effectively promote the modernization of the construction industry and alleviate the increasingly severe environmental and energy crisis. Based on this, the evolutionary game theory is used to establish an evolutionary game model between government and consumers, and the game strategies of both sides are analyzed, the influence of system equilibrium stability and parameters on the stability of evolutionary game is discussed. The dynamic evolution game law of government and consumers based on passive building demand incentive is studied under the premise of limited rationality and fuzzy trust. Then the game trajectory between stakeholders is simulated by MATLAB software, the effects of parameters and initial intention on the evolution process and results are analyzed. It clearly clarifies the dynamic mechanism of the impact of government incentives on behavioral strategies for consumers to buy passive building. It shows that the passive building demand incentive work is focused on government, and the initial intention of government and consumers will directly affect the behavior strategies of both parties. Aiming at the demand incentives of passive building, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are proposed at the three levels of awareness, cost control and income.
Keywords: Passive building, evolutionary game, demand incentive, numerical simulation
DOI: 10.3233/JIFS-179118
Journal: Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 3163-3174, 2019
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