Affiliations: [a] School of Computer Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China
| [b] School of Computer Science and Engineering, VIT University, Vellore, Tamilnadu, India
| [c] Department of Mathematics Chaudhary Charan Singh University Meerut, India
| [d] Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory, Beijing, China
| [e] School of computer and Communication Engineering, Northeastern University At Qinhuangdao, Qinhuangdao, Hebei – P.R. China
Correspondence:
[*]
Corresponding author. Wenbo Shi, School of computer and Communication Engineering, Northeastern University At Qinhuangdao, Qinhuangdao, 066000, Hebei – P.R. China. E-mail: swb319@hotmail.com.
Abstract: In recent years, a large number of spectrum mechanisms have been proposed, but these mechanisms ignore the security issues that arise during the design of the mechanism. In this paper, two secure models for sealed-bid spectrum auction are given based on Wang’s generic spectrum auction mechanism. One is the basic model and another improved model based on the basic model is proposed, which maximizes Social welfare while it is a Privacy-preserving Spectrum auction mechanism with public Verification namely SPSV. The SPSV scheme achieves the properties of maximizing the social welfare but also, by using the double paillier cryptosystem, it is privacy-preserving for bidders’ bids without revealing any sensitive information to auctioneer or agent during the entire spectrum auction. Oblivious transfer is applied to ensure the anonymity of bidders. Furthermore, the use of inequality comparison proof also provides the public verification of winner group to verify the comparison relationship between winner groups and losing groups. At last, the performance analysis are given.
Keywords: Spectrum auction, social welfare, privacy-preserving, public
verification
