Affiliations: The Faculty of Electrical and Computer Engineering of KNT University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
Correspondence:
[*]
Corresponding author. Hossein Hosseini, The Faculty of Electrical and Computer Engineering of KNT University of Technology, Tehran, Iran. E-mail: uh.hosseini@gmai.com.
Abstract: States data are among the most vital transferred data in power systems. Therefore, if the attacks to these states is not recognized, the system performance will get noisy and in the worst case, it will lead to widespread power outages. In this paper, three indicators will be presented to detect false data injection attack (FDI). These indicators use three factors to detect the attacks. The first indicator has been designed based on the performance of traditional power systems. The second indicator, in addition to the first factor, uses a relationship between angle and voltage changes in each bus to detect the attacks. The third one has been designed for detecting the attacks based on the neighbor buses performance. In this paper, FDI attacks have been classified into two categories: Manipulating attack, and PMU attack, in order to investigate the indicators performance. Using two standards of IEEE 14bus and New England 39bus, the indicators performance was analyzed. Our results show that all the three indicators have unique properties and all are successful in detecting attacks on smart grids.
Keywords: Dynamic state estimation, phasor measurement units, false data injection attacks, cyber security.
