Affiliations: Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
Correspondence:
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Corresponding author: Brian M. Bowen, Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA. E-mail: bmbowen@cs.columbia.edu.
Abstract: We propose a novel trap-based architecture for detecting passive, “silent”, attackers who are eavesdropping on enterprise networks. Motivated by the increasing number of incidents where attackers sniff the local network for interesting information, such as credit card numbers, account credentials, and passwords, we introduce a methodology for building a trap-based network that is designed to maximize the realism of bait-laced traffic. Our proposal relies on a “record, modify, replay” paradigm that can be easily adapted to different networked environments. The primary contributions of our architecture are the ease of automatically injecting large amounts of believable bait, and the integration of different detection mechanisms in the back-end. We demonstrate our methodology in a prototype platform that uses our decoy injection API to dynamically create and dispense network traps on a subset of our campus wireless network. Our network traps consist of several types of monitored passwords, authentication cookies, credit cards and documents containing beacons to alarm when opened. The efficacy of our decoys against a model attack program is also discussed, along with results obtained from experiments in the field. In addition, we present a user study that demonstrates the believability of our decoy traffic, and finally, we provide experimental results to show that our solution causes only negligible interference to ordinary users.
