Controlling causal dependencies over a secure network

Article type: Research Article

Authors: d'Ausbourg, Bruno | Calas, Christel

Affiliations: CERT - ONERA, Département d'Etudes et de Recherches en Informatique, 2, Avenue E. Belin, B.P. 4025, 31055 Toulouse Cedex, France, E-mail: ausbourg@cert.fr, calas@cert.fr

Abstract: It was recently argued that the presence of covert channels should no longer be taken for granted in multilevel secure systems. Until today, multilevel security seems to have been an ideal to approach and not a requirement to meet. The question is: is it possible to design a practical multilevel system offering full security? Based on which architecture? The approach described in this paper reflects some results of a research project which suggests some ideas to answer these questions. We have chosen the distributed architecture of a secure LAN as an application framework. In particular we show how controls exerted on dependencies permit to control exhaustively the elementary flows of information. The enforced rules govern both the observation and the handling of data over the whole system. They are achieved by means of some hardware mechanisms that submit the access of hosts to the medium to a secure-medium access control protocol. We evaluate how secure dependencies used to ensure confidentiality and integrity in such an architecture do not prevent to build distributed operating services, as file sharing, over a secure network.

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-1996-4102

Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 3-25, 1996