Affiliations: [a] Sandia National Labs, P.O. Box 969, Livermore, CA 94551, USA. Tel.: (925) 294-4909; Fax: (925) 294-1225; E-mail: nadurgi@sandia.gov | [b] Computer Science Lab., SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, USA. E-mail: lincoln@csl.sri.com | [c] Computer Science Dept., Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. E-mail: jcm@cs.stanford.edu | [d] Mathematics Dept., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. E-mail: scedrov@saul.cis.upenn.edu
Abstract: We formalize the Dolev–Yao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multiset rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the Dolev–Yao model using this notation, and to analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions. We prove that, even for the case where we restrict the size of messages and the depth of message encryption, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of new nonces. We also identify several decidable classes, including a DEXP-complete class when the number of nonces is restricted, and an NP-complete class when both the number of nonces and the number of roles is restricted. We point out a remaining open complexity problem, and discuss the implications these results have on the general topic of protocol analysis.
