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Issue title: Selected Papers From ESORICS 2020
Guest editors: Kaitai Liang, Liqun Chen, Ninghui Li and Steve Schneider
Article type: Research Article
Authors: Paul, Sebastiana; * | Scheible, Patrikb | Wiemer, Friedrichc
Affiliations: [a] Corporate Sector Research and Advance Engineering, Robert Bosch GmbH, Renningen, Germany | [b] Consulting Cyber Security Solutions, ESCRYPT GmbH, Stuttgart, Germany | [c] Cross-Domain Computing Solutions, Robert Bosch GmbH, Stuttgart, Germany
Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author. E-mail: sebastian.paul2@de.bosch.com.
Note: [1] This is an extended version of “Towards post-quantum security for cyber-physical systems” that originally appeared in Computer Security – ESORICS 2020, Springer, pp. 295–316, 2020.
Abstract: The threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer contributes to an increasing interest in the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Compared to existing research efforts regarding the integration of PQC into the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, industrial communication protocols have so far been neglected. Since industrial cyber-physical systems (CPS) are typically deployed for decades, protection against such long-term threats is needed. In this work, we propose two novel solutions for the integration of post-quantum (PQ) primitives (digital signatures and key establishment) into the industrial protocol Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA): a hybrid solution combining conventional cryptography with PQC and a solution solely based on PQC. Both approaches provide mutual authentication between client and server and are realized with certificates fully compliant to the X.509 standard. We implement the two solutions and measure and evaluate their performance across three different security levels. All selected algorithms (Kyber, Dilithium, and Falcon) are candidates for standardization by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We show that Falcon is a suitable option – especially – when using floating-point hardware provided by our ARM-based evaluation platform. Our proposed hybrid solution provides PQ security for early adopters but comes with additional performance and communication requirements. Our solution solely based on PQC shows superior performance across all evaluated security levels in terms of handshake duration compared to conventional OPC UA but comes at the cost of increased handshake sizes. In addition to our performance evaluation, we provide a proof of security in the symbolic model for our two PQC-based variants of OPC UA. For this proof, we use the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif and formally verify confidentiality and authentication properties of our quantum-resistant variants.
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems, post-quantum cryptography, formal security models, OPC UA, ProVerif
DOI: 10.3233/JCS-210037
Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 623-653, 2022
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