Affiliations: [a] School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore. E-mails: ygtian@smu.edu.sg, yjli@smu.edu.sg, yinghuizhang@smu.edu.sg | [b] School of Computing and Information Technology, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia. E-mails: gyang@uow.edu.au, wsusilo@uow.edu.au | [c] Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Network Security and Cryptology, College of Mathematics and Informatics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China. E-mail: ymu.ieee@gmail.com | [d] Computer Science and Software Engineering, RMIT University, Victoria, Australia. E-mail: hui.cui@rmit.edu.au
Abstract: We introduce the first deniable attribute-based key exchange (DABKE) framework that is resilient to impersonation attacks. We define the formal security models for DABKE framework, and propose a generic compiler that converts any attribute-based key exchanges into deniable ones. We prove that it can achieve session key security and user privacy in the standard model, and strong deniability in the simulation-based paradigm. In particular, the proposed generic compiler ensures: 1) a dishonest user cannot impersonate other user’s session participation in conversations since implicit authentication is used among authorized users; 2) an authorized user can plausibly deny his/her participation after secure conversations with others; 3) the strongest form of deniability is achieved using one-round communication between two authorized users.
