Relations between secrets: two formal analyses of the Yahalom protocol

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Paulson, Lawrence C.

Affiliations: Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, Pembroke Street, Cambridge CB2 3QG, UK. E-mail: lcp@cl.cam.ac.uk

Abstract: The Yahalom protocol is one of those analyzed by Burrows et al. [5]. Based upon their analysis, they have proposed modifications to make the protocol easier to understand and to analyze. Both versions of Yahalom have now been analyzed using Isabelle/HOL. Modified Yahalom satisfies strong security goals, and the original version is adequate. The mathematical reasoning behind these machine proofs is presented informally. An Appendix gives extracts from a formal proof. Yahalom presents special difficulties because the compromise of one session key compromises other secrets. The proofs show that the resulting losses are limited. They rely on a new proof technique, which involves reasoning about the relationship between keys and the secrets encrypted by them. This technique is applicable to other difficult protocols, such as Kerberos IV [2]. The new proofs do not rely on a belief logic. They use a fundamentally different formal model: the inductive method. They confirm the BAN analysis and the advantages of the proposed modifications. The new proof methods detect more flaws than BAN and analyze protocols in finer detail, while remaining broadly consistent with the BAN principles. In particular, the proofs confirm the explicitness principle of Abadi and Needham [1]. The proofs also suggest that any realistic model of security must admit that secrets can become compromised over time.

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2001-9302

Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 197-216, 2001