Affiliations: [a] Counterpane Internet Security, 3031 Tisch Way, 100 Plaza East, San Jose, CA 95128, USA. E-mail: kelsey@counterpane.com, schneier@counterpane.com | [b] U.C. at Berkeley, Soda Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-1776, USA. E-mail: daw@cs.berkeley.edu | [c] Princeton University – Mathematics, Fine Hall, Washington Road, Princeton, NJ 08544-1000, USA. E-mail: cjh@math.princeton.edu
Correspondence:
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Corresponding author.
Abstract: Building on the work of Kocher (1996), Jaffe and Yun (1998), we discuss the notion of side-channel cryptanalysis: cryptanalysis using implementation data. We discuss the notion of side-channel attacks and the vulnerabilities they introduce, demonstrate side-channel attacks against three product ciphers – timing attack against IDEA, processor-flag attack against RC5, and Hamming weight attack against DES – and then generalize our research to other cryptosystems.
Keywords: Side channels, cryptanalysis, timing attacks, product ciphers
