Affiliations: [a] School of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China | [b] School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China
Correspondence:
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Corresponding author: Guibao Liang, School of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China. E-mail:289689532@qq.com
Abstract: The revenue-sharing contract model of Stackelberg game is
set for a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of one retailer and one
supplier. Given the constant coefficient of revenue-sharing contract, the
optimal wholesale price strategy of the supplier and the optimal order
strategy of the retailer is analyzed when neither supplier and retailer care
about fairness, only the retailer cares about fairness, only the supplier
cares about fairness and both of them care about fairness, respectively. The
fairness solution of the Nash bargaining is employed as a reference to judge
the equity of allocating benefits in the supply chain so as to analyze
whether the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain and the
compact of fairness behavior on the wholesale price. It is found that when
both the supplier and retailer are in Stackelberg game, whether they care
about fairness, the revenue-sharing contract can't coordinate the supply
chain because the optimal wholesale price of the supplier in the game is
always higher than that in a coordinated supply chain. Moreover, when the
retailer cares about fairness, the wholesale price will decrease in
retailer's fairness and increase in supplier's fairness.
