A new framework for an efficient ticket booking scheme based on mechanism design
Issue title: Special Supplement Issue in Section A and B: Selected Papers from the ISCA International Conference on Software Engineering and Data Engineering, 2011
Affiliations: [a] National Institute of Technology, Durgapur, India | [b] Winona State University, Winona, MN, USA | Department of Computer Science, Winona State University, Winona, MN, USA
Correspondence:
[*]
Corresponding author: S. Mukhopadhyay, National Institute of Technology, Durgapur, India. E-mail: sajmure@gmail.com.
Abstract: Ticket market is a multi-million dollar industry for any popular event. When the tickets are sold by the event organizers in the ticket market, the most popular scheme used is the first-come-first-serve (FCFS). But in a competitive environment is this FCFS efficient? In this paper this situation is investigated from the view point of profit making and efficiency in allocation of the tickets that are being sold. In ticket market multiple customers are handled when each customer has some private value (not known by others) for purchasing a ticket. One tool that has found wide-spread application to address this situation is the framework of mechanism design. In this paper with the use of mechanism design framework some elegant alternative solutions are proposed so that it could outperform the earlier FCFS scheme both from the view point of profit making and efficiency in allocation.
Keywords: Mechanism design, primary ticket market, secondary ticket market, multi unit auction
