Affiliations: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 513 North Park Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47408-3895, USA
Correspondence:
[**]
Address for correspondence: Dr. Elinor Ostrom, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 513 North Park Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47408-3895, USA. Phone #: 812-855-0441, Fax #: 812-855-3150.
Abstract: Current theories of development are predominantly based on the presumption that the obstacles and temptations involved in the local collective-action problems related to the provision and maintenance of common-pool resources are so substantial that only national governments have the capacity to surmount them. The temptation to free ride that underlies collective-action problems is viewed as a major deterrent to development. As each person who uses a collective resource would be better off if everyone else contributed to the provision of joint benefits available to all in the community, whether or not that person contributed, it is presumed that each person would be tempted not to contribute. The difficulty of sustaining collective action over the long term, where contributions are obviously costly and benefits are both hard to measure and dispersed over time and space, deepens the pessimism about the likelihood of success of self-organized efforts. The presumed inability of individuals to undertake their own collective action is used as the foundation for a theory of governance that expounds the need for the State. And yet, farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal tend to achieve average performance levels above those operated by the State. This paper explores the puzzle raised by the anomaly of low-tech systems organized by farmers achieving higher levels of performance than the high-tech systems built largely with donor funding and operated by the national government.
