Does self-interest skew state reporting of greenhouse gas emissions? A preliminary analysis based on the first verified emissions estimates under the Kyoto Protocol
Note: [] Griffith Law School, Australia, (a.zahar@griffith.edu.au). I am very grateful to Larry MacFaul, Chris McGrath, and Greg Picker for their detailed comments on earlier versions of this paper (no agreement implied). I am solely responsible for remaining errors.
Abstract: The paper considers the changes to the base-year GHG-emission inventories of Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol (herein referred to, simply, as Annex B parties) made in the course of the review of those inventories by expert review teams. I ask whether, in the reporting practices of these states, any general tendency is observable of states misreporting (at an advantage to themselves) their emissions prior to the expert review. I conclude that the information to date raises many questions but provides few concrete answers; nevertheless, the issue points to an important area of study within the larger field of environmental governance.
DOI: 10.3233/CL-2010-014
Journal: Climate Law, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 313-324, 2010