Affiliations: Università di Torino, Italy. E-mail: {guido,rossana} @di.unito.it | Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: jhulstijn@feweb.vu.nl | University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg. E-mail: leendert@vandertorre.com
Note: [] Corresponding author.
Abstract: There are two main traditions in defining a semantics for agent communication languages, based either on mental attitudes or on social commitments. These traditions share speech acts as operators with preconditions and effects, and agents playing roles like speaker and hearer, but otherwise they rely on distinct ontologies. They refer not only to either belief and intention or various notions of social commitment, but also to distinct speech acts and distinct kinds of dialogue. In this paper, we propose a common ontology for both approaches based on public mental attitudes attributed to role instances. Public mental attitudes avoid the unverifiability problem of private mental states, while reusing the logics and implementations developed for FIPA compliant approaches. Moreover, a common ontology of communication primitives allows for the construction of agents which do not need separate reasoning modules to participate in dialogues with both mental attitudes and social commitments compliant agents. Moreover, a common ontology of communication primitives allows for the construction of agents participating in and combining the full range of dialogues covered by the individual approaches without having to redefine the existing protocols to cope with new dialog types. We illustrate how to extend the ontology to a semantics for agent communication and how to define mappings from existing semantics to the new one.
Keywords: Agent communication languages, dialogue, speech acts, communication primitives, roles
